

## THE EFFECTS OF DOCTRINE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE OPERATIONS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE EFFECTS OF DOCTRINE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
FORCE OPERATIONS**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) currently leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The primary role of ISAF is to support and assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing and maintaining a secure environment. The purpose of this operation is to facilitate the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the establishment of democratic structures, and the expansion of the central government's influence. While these political objectives are fairly clear, the concepts in which to achieve those objectives are in question. Now in its sixth year, ISAF faces many challenges including waning public support in many NATO member nations. As the leaders of NATO consider a new strategy, they are limited by their doctrine. Although doctrine is not usually associated with strategy, the fundamental principles of how a military force operates greatly affect the implementation of strategy. NATO should evaluate and change its doctrine in light of ISAF's challenges in Afghanistan in order to develop a feasible strategy and determine the role of NATO in future conflicts.



## THE EFFECTS OF DOCTRINE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE OPERATIONS

We must have a more fundamental debate about our Alliance and the way it operates in a radically different security environment.

—Jaap de Hoop Scheffer  
NATO Secretary General

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) currently leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The primary role of ISAF is to support and assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing and maintaining a secure environment. The purpose of this operation is to facilitate the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the establishment of democratic structures, and the expansion of the central government's influence.<sup>1</sup> While these political objectives are fairly clear, the concepts or ways in which to achieve those objectives are in question. Now in its sixth year, ISAF faces the challenges of a persistent Taliban insurgency, slow progress on Afghan governance, and waning public support in many NATO countries. As the political leaders of NATO consider a new strategy, they are limited by NATO doctrine. Although doctrine is not usually associated with the development of strategy, the fundamental principles of how a military force operates greatly affect the implementation of strategy. NATO should evaluate and modify its doctrine in light of ISAF's challenges in Afghanistan. This change should also lead to more effective command and control structure and enhance ISAF operations. A change in doctrine should also better shape strategy development and the role of NATO in future conflicts.

ISAF started with modest, but important, beginnings in Kabul, Afghanistan. The United Nations Security Council signed Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001 authorizing the establishment of ISAF in order to "assist the Afghan Interim Authority in



the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”<sup>2</sup> The principal objectives of this resolution derived from agreements made during a conference in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001, officially cited as the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions. The agreeing parties, including Afghans, the United States, and other NATO countries, committed to establishing a security force, training new Afghan security and armed forces, and assisting in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure.<sup>3</sup> Individual nations initially resourced, manned, and led the ISAF missions. The United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands conducted the first three ISAF missions from December 2001 to August 2003. NATO assumed the authority and leadership of the ISAF mission in August 2003 and continues this role today. Subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions authorized the expansion of the ISAF mission from Kabul to every region in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> ISAF completed this expansion to all of the Afghan provinces in October 2006.

Currently, approximately 47,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians are deployed in support of ISAF. All twenty-six NATO nations and fourteen non-NATO countries contribute forces to the mission. The countries with the largest ISAF contingents include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Italy. The current ISAF commander's intent includes reinforcing the people of Afghanistan's belief in long-term peace and growing economic prosperity; focusing on action that actively assists the Government of Afghanistan in further developing the consent of the people to the Government of Afghanistan; helping ensure the security of

mineral resources, border crossing points, and the transport network, water and power supplies; and supporting and helping to train the Afghan National Security Forces.<sup>5</sup> The subordinate commands of ISAF are called Regional Commands (RC). Regional Commands are commanded using a lead nation structure and coordinate all civil – military activities executed by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) within their region and under the operational control of ISAF. Currently five regional commands exist covering all of Afghanistan. These include RC North under Germany commanding five PRTs, RC West under Italy commanding four PRTs, RC South under the United Kingdom commanding four PRTs, RC East under the United States commanding twelve PRTs, and RC Capital under Italy with no PRTs.<sup>6</sup>

Currently, NATO faces an increasing insurgency in Afghanistan. Failure of the ISAF mission risks enhancing Islamic extremism, providing a safe haven to terrorist organizations, and creating a failed state in a strategically important area. It would also weaken the credibility of NATO in its first major out-of-area operation. Much must still be accomplished before Afghanistan is a safe, secure, and friendly nation. Many regional experts predict that ISAF's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will require five years or more.<sup>7</sup> NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in a 2008 speech that the alliance needed to determine ways to enhance its operational effectiveness in Afghanistan and determine how NATO should operate in today's environment.<sup>8</sup> The military professionals within NATO should approach these issues by addressing NATO doctrine with a view on how the militaries of its members view war and conflict.

To understand how doctrine affects NATO's operations in Afghanistan, it is important to describe a framework for the definition, purpose, and linkages of military

doctrine. This paper does not address the doctrines of foreign policy or grand strategy such as the Eisenhower Doctrine, Mutual Assured Destruction, or the “Bush Doctrine” of preemptive war. Instead, this study focuses on military doctrine or the way in which a military organization views the nature of operations. A noted scholar of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Antulio Echevarria II, writes in *The Future of the Army Profession* that the Army demonstrates all of the accepted characteristics of a profession.<sup>9</sup> Although written primarily for the U.S. Army, the label of professional also applies to the armies and militaries of other NATO members. Echevarria uses James Burk’s adaptation of sociologist Andrew Abbott’s definition of a profession as a “relatively ‘high status’ occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavor.”<sup>10</sup> The abstract knowledge used by the military is its doctrine.

Adrian Lewis, a noted military historian, writes in his book, *The American Culture of War*, that while doctrine is a modern concept, it has actually existed throughout history.<sup>11</sup> Every armed force develops a doctrine to provide its practitioners a common concept, language, and way of thinking about war. It plays the important role of providing the abstract knowledge to solve military problems. The U.S. military and NATO define doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”<sup>12</sup> These fundamental principles provide the abstract knowledge to solve problems or guide the actions of the military profession. However, knowledge alone does not solve problems. Judgment is also required.

Doctrine's purpose to guide actions using fundamental principles applies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Capstone doctrine published by NATO, the U.S., and other militaries generally applies to the strategic and operational levels. These provide overarching guidance for the employment of military forces. U.S. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and NATO's Allied Joint Publication 01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, both serve this role. Additionally, a subset within the hierarchy of doctrine is known as tactics, techniques, and procedures. These generally apply at the tactical level. Tactics pertains to the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Techniques describe methods to perform missions and tasks. Procedures are prescriptive steps of performance usually associated with types of equipment or organizations.<sup>13</sup> Although the practical execution of tactics, techniques, and procedures still require judgment, they are generally more prescriptive than capstone doctrine.

Common misperceptions about the entirety of doctrine as a prescriptive and inflexible set of instructions to be applied in any situation detract from the function of capstone doctrine as the overarching concepts of how a military leader or organization thinks. Because of these misperceptions, some senior leaders disavow the importance that doctrine plays in military operations. General David Richards, a highly respected British General, commanded ISAF IX from April 2006 to February 2007. In a recent interview he cast some doubt on the utility of counterinsurgency doctrine for ISAF operations.<sup>14</sup> He remarked that while he did not believe in the necessity of doctrine, he did train his staff by developing a full understanding of Afghanistan and stressed flexibility, confidence, and judgment. In other words, he developed a concept of military

operations based on fundamental principles. Depending on what definitions are used, he either successfully developed a clear overarching doctrine for his operations or instilled a concept of how his forces within his organization would operate. In other words, he developed his own capstone doctrine.

The importance of capstone doctrine is its focus on how a military organization views operations. A common view on operations within NATO facilitated the alliance's success throughout the Cold War. The adherence to a common set of fundamental principles supported the standardization and interoperability of equipment and procedures. Doctrine aided in the development of trained armed forces through participation in joint and multinational training exercises. The most important characteristic of NATO's common doctrine is that it provided the basis for multinational and joint units to have the ability to work together. NATO's Allied Joint Publication, AJP-01 *Allied Joint Doctrine*, recognizes the importance of its doctrine by stating "the successful planning, execution and support of military operations requires a clearly understood and widely accepted doctrine, and this is especially important when operations are to be conducted by Allied, multinational or coalition forces."<sup>15</sup> The two characteristics of effective doctrine are that it is clearly understood and widely accepted.

As effective doctrine provides the intellectual concepts on how a military operates, it should focus the military on how to think and not what to think. The concepts and thoughts on the nature of operations are crucial developing strategies and plans, as well as conducting these operations.<sup>16</sup> Doctrine should be multifaceted that includes more than high intensity conventional warfare. Conversely, it should not solely focus on other types of war such as peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and other irregular

warfare. Effective doctrine emphasizes an intellectual creativity and prepares the forces to deal with uncertain and adaptive adversaries. Finally, effective doctrine provides the framework to the military leader that his or her actions have unforeseen consequences that add complexity to uncertain and changing situations.<sup>17</sup>

The U.S. military and NATO see themselves as doctrine-based. In the past they have changed how they operate based on changes in the strategic environment. Their concepts or views on operations have changed just as the threat has changed. However, some NATO members still struggle with what role the military should play in this changed environment. As an example, the role the military plays in counter-terrorism activities as opposed to law enforcement is in debate. Since the end of the Cold War, the environment changed from one where NATO and the U.S. faced a peer adversary in the form of the large armed forces of the Soviet Union to one of persistent conflict where NATO faces a combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats.<sup>18</sup>

The challenges of this changed environment require different capabilities. The U.S. military categorizes capabilities within the domains of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.<sup>19</sup> Of these components doctrine plays the most significant role because it provides an intellectual foundation for which a military capability builds upon. All other domains rely on the concepts or doctrine that states how the military plans to operate. The organizational, personnel, and equipment requirements are based on their doctrinal use. More importantly, the members of the organization are trained, educated, and led within the context of that doctrine. This especially applies to those who make careers in the

military and stay for long periods of time. Over time this doctrine becomes internalized by the military's personnel and becomes a part of its military culture.

John A. Lynn, a prominent military historian, defines military culture as the concepts of war and combat within a military organization.<sup>20</sup> These concepts are nearly synonymous to the fundamental principles defined as capstone doctrine. A comparison between military culture and doctrine shows that both are based on the same principles. Although not completely synonymous, doctrine greatly affects military culture, and military culture also affects doctrine. The U.S. change in doctrine from Mobile Defense to Air Land Battle in the early 1980s greatly affected the U.S. Army's military culture. The new doctrine was based on "securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy."<sup>21</sup> Partly based on this doctrine the Army transformed itself by embracing initiative and aggressiveness that renewed its spirit and morale after the withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970s. This renewed offensive and aggressive spirit also affected the U.S. strategic culture. Strategic culture is the combination of societal and military cultures.<sup>22</sup> As the military culture regained confidence, so did the strategic culture. This resulted in more aggressive strategies near the end of the Cold War. This path of linkages of doctrine to military culture to strategic culture shows that a military's doctrine is indirectly linked to a nation's strategy.

A suitable definition of strategy comes from the book, *Modern Strategy*, by Colin Gray, a well-known writer on strategic issues. He defines strategy as "the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy."<sup>23</sup> He further elaborates that he adapted Carl von Clausewitz's definition of strategy as "the use of engagements for the object of the war."<sup>24</sup> The U.S. Army War College teaches strategy within these

contexts. The lessons on strategy to the Army's future senior leaders define it as a combination of ends, ways, and means.<sup>25</sup> Strategy is simply the application of resources (means) within a specific concept or course of action (ways) to accomplish a political objective (ends).<sup>26</sup> Strategy attempts to effectively combine required resources with a course of action that will achieve a political objective or in other words to balance ends, ways, and means. Doctrine provides the link between the ideas of strategy and the behavior required to implement the strategy. Another purpose of doctrine is to explain the goals, identify the tasks, and shape the tools of the military organization. It helps that organization maintain internal cohesion in how it prepares for, and prosecutes military operations."<sup>27</sup> Doctrine defined as fundamental principles become the "how" or concept used to achieve an objective. Doctrine performs the function of providing a common perspective. Doctrine, therefore, is the military's link to national political objectives.<sup>28</sup> The U.S. military's capstone doctrinal manual, Joint Publication 1, clearly states that doctrine functions as a link between policy and doctrine.<sup>29</sup>

### NATO Doctrine

NATO defines military strategy as "that component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations."<sup>30</sup> As doctrine is indirectly connected to strategy, the political objectives of a nation, or in this case, an alliance of nations become vital to the development of NATO doctrine. These objectives are clearly described in the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.



They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>31</sup>

The key section of this treaty focuses on the collective defense of its members within Article 5 which states that an armed attack against one or more NATO members will be considered an attack against them all. At the time of the signing of the treaty in 1949, the Soviet Union presented the primary threat to NATO.

The wording of the treaty frames the alliance's principle of collective defense by focusing on "armed attack." The common perception of the armed attack definition developed from the experiences of World War II. An armed attack commonly meant an attack from conventional armed forces including infantry, tanks, artillery, and other common military organizations and equipment. Due to this thinking, NATO developed a mind set of conducting Article 5 operations that became synonymous with combat operations. This focus on a conventional armed attack affected all aspects of building NATO's military capabilities. The organization, training, leadership development and education, materiel procurement, and personnel policies were solely focused on conducting Article 5 combat operations.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO no longer felt the threat of armed attack coming from the east in the form of conventional means. However, the purpose and intent of the North Atlantic treaty remained in tact. The alliance still wished to provide collective defense to its member nations. The security threat still remained, just not from a large military centered on the Soviet Union. At this time NATO developed the concept

of Crisis Response Operations. This concept matured and was formalized in the Alliance Strategic Concept approved by the leaders of NATO countries at the Washington Summit on 23 April 1999.<sup>32</sup> The 1999 strategic concept still in effect today makes the case for combining security of its members as NATO's essential purpose with striving for peace and stability of the wider European and Atlantic area outside of NATO's boundaries. This concept provided for the larger scope of actively engaging in crisis management, including crisis response operations.<sup>33</sup>

Although no formal definition exists for Crisis Response Operations, NATO doctrine describes them as covering the entire spectrum of NATO military operations not included by Article 5 collective defense.<sup>34</sup> These operations can be described as:

Such operations are normally known as Peace Support Operations (PSO). They are conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognized organization such as the UN or the OSCE, involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief.<sup>35</sup>

In practice, crisis response operations were limited to peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and other operations then characterized as military operations other than war. The main difference between collective defense and crisis response operations is the invocation of Article 5 of the treaty. Legally, a collective defense operation stipulates that the decision to employ military forces is taken collectively by NATO members.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, crisis response operations can be carried out by one or more coalitions of willing nations within or from outside the alliance.

The NATO concept of armed attack was challenged by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States suffered an attack and NATO invoked the treaty's Article 5 on 12 September 2001 in response.<sup>37</sup> However, this armed attack did

not fit into the pre-conceived model of Article 5. The attack came from terrorists using commercial airplanes as cruise missiles steered into their targets. Traditional NATO armed forces trained, exercised, equipped, and manned for conventional warfare could not use their Article 5 operation skills to respond to these attackers. The security environment had changed from the time of the Cold War and the events in the Balkans in the 1990s. The concept of armed attack proved different as well the ideas within crisis response operations. The strategic ends of the North Atlantic Treaty remained valid. Collective defense, peace, and security remained the political objectives of the alliance. However, the threats to these ends significantly changed, so the ways and means to achieve those ends needed to change as well.

#### Effect of NATO Doctrine on the ISAF Mission

As earlier stated, a primary characteristic of doctrine is it describes how a military organization views the nature of operations. Current NATO doctrine divides military operations into two broad categories. One category is collective defense and the other includes crisis response operations where collective defense is not involved.<sup>38</sup> The only official difference is that collective defense operations imply the automatic commitment of forces in accordance with Article 5 of the treaty. Crisis response operations, on the other hand, do not receive any automatic commitments. Other non-NATO nations may also participate in crisis response operations.<sup>39</sup>

In practice, this doctrine affected both the military culture and strategic culture of many NATO nations in Europe. Collective defense operations, also known as Article 5 operations, became synonymous with major combat operations. Training and exercises focused on Article 5 operations demonstrated NATO's ability to conduct offense and

defense in a high intensity conflict environment. Simultaneously, crisis response operations were commonly identified as peace support operations.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the U.S. initiated Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The military objectives of the operation were to “disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.”<sup>40</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom could clearly be classified as a major combat operation. Shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime, the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 called for the establishment of ISAF with the objectives of establishing a security force, training new Afghan security and armed forces, and assisting in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure.

The view of the ISAF mission within NATO reflected the doctrine, as well as the military and strategic cultures of many of the NATO countries. ISAF was seen as a crisis response operation which equated to a Peace Support Operation. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 provided the NATO requirement for legitimacy and the mission neatly fit the crisis response operation model. On the other hand, Operation Enduring Freedom was viewed as a combat operation, but did not warrant the automatic commitment of forces for collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Two distinct views of conflict arose within the same theater of operations.

These two views directly affect NATO's ability to reach its stated political objectives for ISAF. The view that ISAF is a Peace Support Operation does not account for the harsh realities that providing security and executing reconstruction operations

within Afghanistan sometimes requires ISAF forces to engage in combat with Taliban insurgents. Conversely, the U.S. led combat missions can negatively affect ISAF's reconstruction efforts. U.S. forces should look to their own doctrine, albeit fairly new, concerning counterinsurgency operations. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, published in December 2006, states "military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN (counterinsurgency) and apply that knowledge."<sup>41</sup>

One of the most limiting factors for ISAF is the use of national caveats. Some NATO partners put restrictions on the use of their forces while participating in ISAF. National caveats are a normal consideration during multinational operations. Many caveats result from a lack of training or equipment.<sup>42</sup> However, ISAF faces caveats that restrict their forces from deploying to other areas of Afghanistan or from participating in combat operations denying the commander the ability to plan and prosecute operations.<sup>43</sup> These types of caveats reflect how a nation views the conduct of operations. The countries that impose a no combat caveat on their forces do not believe that combat is an option when conducting Peace Support Operations which may have its roots in NATO's two broad types of operations. These caveats create divides within the alliance between the countries that do engage in combat and those that do not. Much of the recent U.S. criticism against its NATO allies focuses on this issue. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believes that NATO may evolve into a two-tiered alliance where "some allies are willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and others who are not."<sup>44</sup>

The NATO Secretary General recently remarked that the choice to conduct reconstruction operations or combat operations is an illusion.<sup>45</sup> However, this illusion is described in NATO doctrine and practice. NATO should reassess its capstone doctrine and develop concepts on how to best conduct operations in a complex environment. The question should not be whether to conduct reconstruction or combat operations, but how to conduct both simultaneously. Military professionals should apply their abstract knowledge to solve problems and not compound them.

Another effect of NATO's doctrine of two broad types of missions is the complex command and control structure in Afghanistan. The two operations maintain two separate chains of command. The combat operations of Operation Enduring Freedom fall under the command of U.S. Central Command headquartered in Tampa, Florida. However, the U.S. also conducts Peace Support Operations, such as the operations of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The CSTC-A mission is to provide advisors, mentors, and trainers to assist the Government of Afghanistan to organize, train, equip, employ, and support the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. With strength of over 7000 soldiers, CSTC-A operates under the command of U.S. Central Command.<sup>46</sup>

The Peace Support Operations of ISAF fall under the command of NATO's Allied Command for Operations based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. The U.S. provides the commanding general for ISAF who reports through NATO's Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum in The Netherlands to the Allied Commander – Operations at SHAPE. Not limited to Peace Support Operations, ISAF forces routinely conduct combat operations throughout Afghanistan, just without

the required forces due to national caveats. ISAF also conducts training for Afghan security forces like CSTC-A. It leads a mentor program named the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Program.<sup>47</sup> These teams are embedded within Afghan Army battalions, brigades, garrisons, and corps headquarters to provide training, mentoring, and liaison with ISAF units. While the CSTC-A mission focuses on the initial training and equipping of Afghan units, the OMLTs focus on mentoring and training during operational deployments of the Afghan units.

The dual chain of command within Afghanistan between the U.S. and NATO violates the principle of unity of command. NATO doctrine recognizes that at the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict, a fundamental tenet of operations is unity of command.<sup>48</sup> Unity of command is achieved by authorizing a single commander to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets. For crisis response operations, unity of command is a stated non-negotiable principle within NATO.<sup>49</sup> Both ISAF and U.S. forces conduct combat operations, but not under the same commander. Additionally, both ISAF and U.S. forces conduct separate Peace Support Operations, but not under the same commander. These two missions could achieve better unity of effort if combined under one command under ISAF. One unified direction of training and equipping priorities would greatly increase the effectiveness of these two important programs.

Another way to achieve a more effective command and control structure for ISAF is to adhere to validated doctrine and eliminate one level of NATO command. Operations by allied joint forces are directed, planned and executed at three levels. They are directed at the strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and

tactical levels.<sup>50</sup> The NATO military command structure consists of two strategic level headquarters with one focused on operations (Allied Command Operations) and one focused on transforming the alliance (Allied Command Transformation). Within Allied Command Operations include three Joint Force Commands (Brunssum and Naples) and one Joint Headquarters in Lisbon at the operational level. However, ISAF is also considered an operational level headquarters, but reports to JFC Brunssum. This command and control arrangement adds an extra headquarters layer between the strategic command at Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) and ISAF and is not necessary. NATO should eliminate the requirement of ISAF reporting to JFC Brunssum and change the structure to report directly to SHAPE.<sup>51</sup> NATO should adopt the concepts of supported and supporting commands. ISAF would be the supported command while JFC Brunssum would serve as the supporting command.

### Changing Doctrine

The significant change to the recently published capstone doctrine contained in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, is the inclusion of stability operations as a core competency of the U.S. Army. It recognizes that stability operations are as important as offensive and defensive operations to achieve military success.<sup>52</sup> This revolutionary shift in doctrine recognizes that the old way of looking at warfare is changing. There is not one set of warfare that includes the typical employment of conventional infantry, artillery, armor, and other enablers to conduct purely offensive and defensive actions away from the local population and other types of operations other than war that include peace support operations among the population. Warfare today also includes combat against insurgents, terrorists, and other state and non-state actors that employ



destructive tactics from within the populace, as well as the typical state sponsored armed force. What the new field manual stresses is that collective defense, or Article 5 operations and crisis response operations can occur simultaneously in the same area of operations.

NATO also recognizes the changes in warfare and is actually adapting its doctrine. It changed its capstone doctrinal manual, Allied Joint Publication 01, dated 21 March 2007.<sup>53</sup> Some think that this new doctrine may start the path towards a new way at viewing operations. One recommendation is to develop a doctrine that allows NATO to build the capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As pointed out earlier, doctrine provides its practitioners with fundamental principles to guide their actions. These principles should account for the full spectrum of conflict.

## Conclusion

Deploying to Afghanistan began a new approach for NATO. Originally restricted within its members' borders to conduct collective defense, NATO now embarked on an out of area mission well beyond its boundaries with the primary purpose to safeguard its security. The foundations for this approach occurred in the 1990s with operations in the Balkans, but now ISAF was clearly outside of Europe and the North Atlantic area. NATO's efforts in Afghanistan have been called a test for the alliance.<sup>54</sup> NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in a 29 February 2008 speech in Washington, D.C. that "allied solidarity is put to the test in our operations. It is a challenging test, and there will be times when some may feel that we are failing that test."<sup>55</sup> He also described the overarching interests for NATO in regards to Afghanistan. These include the security of the nations of NATO which lies at the core reason for the

alliance's existence. He stated that if the ISAF mission were to fail, then Afghanistan would "pose a clear and present danger to itself, its region, and the broader international community."<sup>56</sup> This thought aligns with the purpose of the original North Atlantic Treaty. However, NATO's methods of securing peace and security for NATO countries are questioned with ISAF's out of sector mission. The allies agree on the political objectives of ISAF, but disagree on the ways to achieve those goals.<sup>57</sup>

As the political leaders of NATO meet to develop a strategy to meet their stated goals in Afghanistan, the professional militaries of NATO should also reassess its doctrine. Although NATO doctrine proved very successful in the past, the new strategic environment and emerged threats now invalidate many aspects of the shared abstract knowledge to solve problems. The concept of dividing military operations into two distinct and separate categories places NATO forces at a disadvantage when facing today's enemies. Soldiers trained to conduct Peace Support Operations find themselves fighting pitched battles. Simultaneously, soldiers trained to conduct combat operations may win tactical engagements, but lose the campaign due the second and third order effects of their actions.

Changing doctrine appears easy, but as Clausewitz reminds us "everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."<sup>58</sup> The NATO military, as a successful professional force, maintains control over its doctrine, or abstract knowledge. To remain a successful profession, NATO should revise this doctrine relevant to the changes in the contemporary environment. The most successful professions are those that manage to retain positive control over their based of knowledge, revising them as necessary to keep them relevant in the face of change.<sup>59</sup>

## Endnotes

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